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Introduction
This paper studies Canadian monthly bankruptcy data from January 2014 to February 2022 with
an aim towards identifying the existence of underlying heterogeneity in the decision-making of
firms across different industry sectors during periods of economic adversity. The data used
include provincial two-digit NAICS bankruptcy level data, provincial pandemic-related data
concerning the evolution of cases and stringency of adopted policies, and external factors
pertaining to the domestic and foreign economies such as industry GDP, the overnight rate
target, exchange rates, imports and exports, prices, and bond liquidity premium. The method is
two-fold. First, we identify changes in bankruptcy trends caused by the pandemic both
provincially and by industry sector, and then contrast the findings with the results from a zeroinflated Poisson GLM model that assesses the probability of bankruptcies occurring at different
points in time given the set of inputs described above. Second, the model is used to predict
bankruptcy numbers for three different intervals during the reference period: 2019, 2020-2022,
and 2021-2022. It is noted that despite the model’s ability to accurately predict bankruptcy
values for 2019, its accuracy decreases for the pandemic period, even when pandemic-related
variables are controlled for. The conclusion is that the drop in Canadian bankruptcies during the
pandemic seen in the data must be accounted for some other factor that upheld firms’ continued
operations, such as the Canadian Emergency Business Account (CEBA) program, which
facilitated access to credit. The presence of underlying heterogeneity is inferred from the fact
that if heterogeneity was not present, then controlling for industry sector would suffice to capture
the effect of such a program, thus increasing the accuracy of predictions for the pandemic period.
The rest of the paper is divided into six sections. The first details data sources, the second
explains data characteristics and transformations applied, the third presents descriptive statistics
and plots, the fourth shows the model findings, the fifth depicts the predictions, and the sixth
concludes.

I.

Data Sources

Data were mostly collected from statistical databases and government websites. For the 20142022 period, monthly bankruptcy data were collected from the annual Monthly Insolvency
Statistics in Canada reports by Industry Canada, which list the monthly number of bankruptcies
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and business proposals1 by province for each industry type under the NAICS classification.
Monthly bankruptcy observations used in this paper include both the number of bankruptcies and
business proposals for each industry. Daily provincial COVID cases were also collected directly
from the Government of Canada website under its COVID-19 epidemiology update.
The Oxford Stringency Index was adopted as a measure of COVID policy stringency. It
quantifies the severity of COVID-related policies such as school and workplace closings,
international travel controls, and cancellation of public events using a 0-100 scale of increasing
stringency.2 Index data for Canadian provinces is published by Statistics Canada on a monthly
basis and includes values for the vaccinated, unvaccinated, and total populations. Only values for
the total population were used in this paper.
Other data collected from Statistics Canada include monthly GDP by industry under the NAICS
classification and national imports. Industrial GDP values are presented in the form of seasonally
adjusted at annual rates chained 2012 dollars. Monthly imports data was generated by
multiplying seasonally adjusted Paasche price indexes and Laspeyres volume indexes on a
balance of payments basis. For the imports, only the total of all merchandise was considered.
Finally, monetary data was collected from the Bank of Canada and FRED websites. It includes
monthly target overnight rates (relative to the last day of each month); monthly exchange rates
between the Canadian dollar and the US dollar, the British pound, the Japanese yen, and the
Chinese renminbi (indicative rates obtained from averages of aggregated price quotes from
financial institutions3); the monthly Canadian CPI percentage change over the previous 12
months; and monthly Federal Funds Effective Rate for the United States. It should be noted that
the calculation methodology for the monthly exchange rates adopted by the Bank of Canada up
to April 2017 differed from the current one.4

II.

Data Transformations

Bankruptcies
The complete bankruptcy dataset containing all the information from the Monthly Insolvency
Statistics in Canada reports for the January 2014 to February 2022 period consisted of 3,034,211
observations, 96.18% of which had 0 bankruptcies plus business proposals (hereafter referred to
simply as “bankruptcies”) associated with them. Under the assumption that results would not
differ significantly across industry subsectors of each NAICS sector, all subsector observations
were removed from the dataset, leaving it with 32,919 total monthly observations for the main
industry sectors under the NAICS classification (sectors 11, 21, 22, 23, 31, 32, 33, 41, 44, 45, 48,

1

Refers to corporate proposals (filed by a corporate entity, with 100 percent of its liabilities business related) and
proposals filed by an individual with 50 percent or more of his/her liabilities business related and less than 50
percent consumer related.
2
The index calculation method can be found at Index construction - 2020 (statcan.gc.ca).
3
Monthly Exchange Rates - Bank of Canada
4
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/rates/exchange/legacy-noon-and-closing-rates/
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49, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 61, 62, 71, 72, 81, and 91). A total of 72.27% of the observations in
the reduced data frame had 0 bankruptcies associated with them.
Because the industry GDP data obtained from Statistics Canada aggregates the Manufacturing
(31-33), Retail trade (44-45), and Transportation and warehousing (48-49) sectors, the same was
done to the bankruptcy dataset. The resulting bankruptcy dataset had 27,431 observations,
71.72% of which had 0 bankruptcies associated with them.
Restriction Indexes
As previously noted, the restriction indexes dataset initially displayed indexes for the vaccinated,
unvaccinated, and total populations for each month, totalling 15,600 observations from January
2020 to January 2022. The first two categories were discarded, leaving the dataset with 5,200
observations on COVID-related monthly restriction indexes by province and by restriction level
(gym closings, restrictions on internal movement, etc.) for the total Canadian population.
Secondly, monthly index values for 2014-2019 and for February 2022 were generated as 0,
leaving the dataset with 20,384 total observations from January 2014 to February 2022. Finally,
a column with monthly changes in restriction indexes was added to the dataset.
COVID Cases
Daily values of 0 for the 2014-2019 period were also included in the COVID cases dataset, and
the daily data was aggregated to month for each province. This yielded a data frame with 1,239
total observations from January 2014 to February 2022. Observations were then converted into
monthly percentage changes.
Imports
The imports dataset obtained from Statistics Canada was initially reduced to contain only
seasonally adjusted values for the total of all merchandise on a balance of payments basis. The
reduced dataset totalled 339 monthly observations on the Laspeyres fixed weighted price and
volume indexes and the Paasche current weighted price index. Then, an imports column was
generated by multiplying the Paasche price index and the Laspeyres volume index for each
month. The final dataset holding only monthly import values from January 2014 to February
2022 contained 98 observations. Finally, import values were converted into monthly percentage
changes.
Industry GDP
The complete industry GDP dataset obtained from Statistics Canada was first reduced by
removing non-NAICS sectors and leaving it with only seasonally adjusted GDP values based on
chained 2012 dollars. This resulted in a dataset with 1,960 observations from January 2014 to
February 2022.
To allow the model to capture the effect of industry GDP on bankruptcies for different industry
sectors, the dataset was split into 19 other datasets, one for each NAICS sector. Each of these
datasets carried the original GDP values for one NAICS sector and values of 0 for the remaining
sectors. GDP values were then transformed into monthly percentage changes.
3

Liquidity Premium
The liquidity premium was calculated from the monthly long and short bond yields obtained
from the FRED website. It is the difference between the long and short bond rates. The dataset
contained 98 observations from January 2014 to February 2022.
Exchange Rates
Obtained from the Bank of Canada website, monthly exchange rates between the Canadian
Dollar and the American Dollar, Japanese Yen, British Pound and Chinese Renminbi were
converted into monthly percentage changes. The final dataset contained 392 observations from
January 2014 to February 2022.
After applying the above transformations, individual datasets for each variable were merged into
a single dataset with 407,536 observations for the reference period. Because Canadian territories
showed very little or no variation in bankruptcies over the reference period, as shown in the next
section, they were removed from the dataset, leaving it with 313,456 observations.

III.

Descriptive Statistics and Plots

The first plot shows a histogram of bankruptcies in the complete dataset. With 68.36% of zeroes,
it shows that the bankruptcy data is zero-inflated.

Plot 1: Frequency of Bankruptcy Observations, 2014-2022 Data

The following two tables show the NAICS sectors adopted in the paper and descriptive statistics
for the variables used, respectively.
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Table 1
NAICS Sectors by Code
Code
11
21
22
23
31-33
41
44-45
48-49
51
52
53
54
55
56
61
62
71
72
81
91

Sector
Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting
Mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction
Utilities
Construction
Manufacturing
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Transportation and warehousing
Information and cultural industries
Finance and insurance
Real estate and rental and leasing
Professional, scientific and technical services
Management of companies and enterprises
Administrative and support, waste management and remediation services
Educational services
Health care and social assistance
Arts, entertainment and recreation
Accommodation and food services
Other services (except public administration)
Public administration
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics, 2014-2022 Data

Variable
Bankruptcies
Restriction Indexes Monthly
Change
COVID Cases
Overnight Rate Target
Industry GDP % Change Sector 11
Industry GDP % Change Sector 21
Industry GDP % Change Sector 22
Industry GDP % Change Sector 23
Industry GDP % Change Sectors 31-33
Industry GDP % Change Sector 41
Industry GDP % Change Sectors 44-45
Industry GDP % Change Sectors 48-49
Industry GDP % Change Sector 51

Number of
Observations
27,431

Provincial or
National
Provincial

Mean
1.131

Variance
13.8

Provincial
Provincial
National

0.8172
558137
0.8265

98

National

98

Minimum

Maximum
0

47

18.7636
6.79E+12
0.2773

0
0
0.25

76.21
30052473
1.75

0.0672

1.5845

-5.0874

4.4776

National

0.1679

6.7842

-8.5061

7.8235

98

National

0.0521

2.6321

-4.1685

4.0771

98

National

0.1256

7.1574

-18.5015

14.133

98

National

0.109

8.68

20.3436

11.7942

98

National

0.1693

8.3225

-17.9874

16.288

98

National

0.2233

15.3594

-20.3628

19.1498

98

National

0.068

8.1566

-21.2

8.0259

98

National

0.2705

0.6315

-4.94

1.8071

20,383
1,239
98
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Industry GDP % Change Sector 52
Industry GDP % Change Sector 53
Industry GDP % Change Sector 54
Industry GDP % Change Sector 55
Industry GDP % Change Sector 56
Industry GDP % Change Sector 61
Industry GDP % Change Sector 62
Industry GDP % Change Sector 71
Industry GDP % Change Sector 72
Industry GDP % Change Sector 81
Industry GDP % Change Sector 91
Imports % Change
USDCAD Rate % Change
JPYCAD Rate % Change
GBPCAD Rate % Change
CNYCAD Rate % Change
CPI % Change
Liquidity Premium

i.

98

National

0.3343

0.4162

-2.3774

2.0335

98

National

0.2213

0.3185

-3.414

2.4982

98

National

0.288

1.6755

-10.7944

2.8017

98

National

-1.7067

2.7388

-8.914

2.4093

98

National

0.0315

6.476

-15.5805

10.7992

98

National

0.1341

3.096

-9.5698

6.9587

98

National

0.1848

3.3855

-11.7179

8.9281

98

National

0.0645

37.655

-39.399

15.5844

98

National

0.3687

62.7516

-43.2307

29.3605

98

National

0.1017

13.1677

-27.5765

11.5118

98
98
98
98
98
98
98
98

National
National
National
National
National
National
National
National

0.1432
0.4191
0.1983
0.1017
0.0057
0.1513
1.874
0.0627

0.5145
17.4815
3.3106
6.2239
3.7504
2.7909
1.1754
0.0032

-5.2044
-23.7025
-4.5796
-7.1082
-6.3534
-4.045
-0.4
-0.0727

1.852
20.652
5.0883
7.3737
4.4578
4.634
5.7
0.1609

Plots: monthly bankruptcies by NAICS sector over time

Plots 2-21 depict the evolution of the number of bankruptcies over the reference period for each
NAICS sector. Bankruptcy numbers are aggregated to Canada. Three lines are shown on each
plot: a blue line, which is the trend over the entire period analyzed; a red line, which represents
the trend in bankruptcies pre-March 2022; and a green line, which shows the trend in
bankruptcies post-March 2022. The shadings around the lines portray the standard errors.
Sectors 21, 22, 61, and 91 showed little or no difference in their pre- and post-pandemic
bankruptcy trends. By contrast, sectors 11, 23, 48-49, 54, 56, and 81 suffered a change in the
slope of their trends, from declining to increasing. Other sectors that suffered slope changes
include sectors 31-33, 52 and 72, whose declines in bankruptcies decelerated, sector 44-45,
whose decline in bankruptcies accelerated, sectors 51 and 62, whose rise in bankruptcies
accelerated, and sectors 53 and 55, which went from increasing to declining bankruptcy trends.
Moreover, sectors 23, 31-33, 41, 51, 54, and 72 also suffered level changes in their bankruptcies,
which dropped significantly during the pandemic period.
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Plot 2: Sector 11 - Monthly Bankruptcies Over Time

Plot 3: Sector 21 - Monthly Bankruptcies Over Time

Plot 4: Sector 22 - Monthly Bankruptcies Over Time
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Plot 5: Sector 23 - Monthly Bankruptcies Over Time

Plot 6: Sectors 31-33 - Monthly Bankruptcies Over Time

Plot 7: Sector 41 - Monthly Bankruptcies Over Time
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Plot 9: Sectors 48-49 - Monthly Bankruptcies Over Time

Plot 10: Sector 51 - Monthly Bankruptcies Over Time
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ii.

Plots: monthly bankruptcies by province over time

Plots 22-34 show the evolution of the number of bankruptcies over the reference period for each
province. Bankruptcy numbers are aggregated to all industry sectors. Like in the previous
section, the blue line on each plot depicts the overall trend, with the red line showing the preMarch 2022 trend and the green line representing the post-March 2022 trend. The shadings
around the lines portray the standard errors.
Notably, the Northwest Territories had no bankruptcies during the reference period, with Yukon
and Nunavut having just a few. This miniscule variation in bankruptcy numbers justified the
exclusion of the territories in the subsequent analysis.
It can be observed that Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick, Quebec and
Saskatchewan went from having decreasing bankruptcy numbers before the pandemic to having
increasing numbers since its start. By contrast, Alberta and Newfoundland and Labrador suffered
13

a change in the slope of their trends in the opposite direction. Although not suffering a change in
the sign of its slope, Ontario’s post-March 2022 trend shows a deceleration in the decline of
bankruptcies in the province. The opposite is true for Manitoba, whose decline in bankruptcies
accelerated since the start of the pandemic in the country. Finally, British Columbia’s plot does
not show a noticeable change in the trend’s slope, although its level increased. Other provinces
that had visible level changes in their bankruptcies include Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba,
Saskatchewan, and Newfoundland and Labrador. Canada, as a whole, experienced both a level
decline in bankruptcies and a slope change in its trend because of the pandemic – it went from
declining to increasing overall bankruptcies.

Plot 22: Nova Scotia - Monthly Bankruptcies Over Time

Plot 23: Prince Edward Island - Monthly Bankruptcies Over Time
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IV.

Results

Table 3 displays the estimation results. It was found that during the 2014-2022 period, all
provinces and NAICS sectors were very statistically significant relative to their respective
benchmarks – Alberta and sector 72 – in explaining the probability of bankruptcies occurring.
This is unsurprising given the obvious variation in economic conditions across provinces and the
differing impacts of changing economic circumstances on the different industry sectors.
Moreover, most industry sectors’ monthly percentage change in GDP is also significant, with the
exceptions being the GDP change of sectors 41, 44-45, 48-49, and 52, which had very little or no
significant coefficients. Other significant variables include the monthly percentage changes in
CPI, exports, imports, and exchange rates (apart from USDCAD), as well as the liquidity
premium, the monthly change in the restriction index, and the dummy variable for the pandemic
period. These results are all expected, since these factors, which represent the bulk of external
conditions faced by firms (such as prices, competition, and access to capital), affect their
decisions and capability to stay afloat.
The high insignificance of the overnight rate target and restriction levels (categories) relative to
their benchmark, “Cancel public events”, was unexpected. A possible explanation for this
finding, with regards to the overnight rate, is that its effect might already be captured by the
variation in the other variables, particularly the dummy variable for the pandemic period: the
strong lowering of the overnight rate by the Bank of Canada in response to demand shocks
caused by the pandemic certainly affected bankruptcies by facilitating access to credit; however,
this effect is nullified when we control for the pandemic period. As for restriction levels, it seems
that despite restrictions being significant in the aggregate, as shown by the low p-value found for
the changes in the restriction index, restrictions imposed on different sectors of the economy
affected bankruptcies similarly.
The signs of the estimated coefficients tell us that, among provinces, only Ontario and Quebec
were more likely than Alberta to contain firms that shut down. The respective average marginal
effects (AME) show that Quebec was the most likely to contain bankruptcies relative to Alberta,
while Prince Edward Island was the least likely. Among industry sectors, the model findings
show that only sector 23 (Construction) was more likely to suffer bankruptcies than sector 72
(Accommodation and food services), albeit this increased probability was small as per the
respective AME. This is perfectly in line with expectations, given that these two sectors were the
most affected by the pandemic. Also, relative to sector 72, sector 91 (Public administration) was
the least likely to suffer bankruptcies. This is also expected, given that public agencies rarely go
bankrupt.
With regards to percentage changes in industry GDP, the results were mixed. For some sectors,
an increase in percentage GDP change increased the probability of bankruptcies, while the
opposite was true for other sectors. Despite these effects being small according to the estimates
AMEs, this is curious and warrants further investigation.
With respect to percentage changes in exchange rates, a higher depreciation of the Canadian
Dollar relative to Japanese Yen and British Pound led to a decreased probability of bankruptcies,
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while the opposite was true for a depreciation of the Canadian Dollar relative to the Chinese
renminbi. This is in line with economic theory and Canadian foreign trade: according to the
Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), Canada is a net exporter relative to the UK and
Japan, and a net importer relative to China.5 Thus, when the CAD depreciates relative to the
GBP or JPY, Canadian net revenue from trade with those countries increases, augmenting the
profits of Canadian domestic firms and lowering the probability of bankruptcies. The opposite is
true when the CAD depreciates relative to the CNY. In this case, Canada loses money since its
Chinese imports exceed its exports to China, and hence domestic profits suffer, increasing the
probability of bankruptcies. The low significance of the USDCAD coefficient can also be
explained in these terms: since Canada’s net exports with the US are very small6, a change in
exchange rates likely does not alter domestic profits significantly. Moreover, estimated AMEs
show that changes in CNYCAD had the biggest effect on bankruptcy probability among the
exchange rates studied. This reflects the very low value of Canadian net exports with China –
according to OEC, Canada imported $49.5 billion from China, while only exporting $19.3 billion
to that country.
The sign of the coefficient of the percentage change in CPI also accords with theory. Ceteris
paribus, higher prices augment the profits of firms, thus decreasing the probability of
bankruptcies. Nonetheless, the respective AME was small. With regards to percentage changes
in imports and exports, the signs of their coefficients reflect the impacts of foreign competition
on the domestic economy. When domestic firms export more, their profits increase, lowering the
probability of bankruptcies. On the other hand, when domestic consumers import more, and
assuming little variation in their incomes, they buy less from domestic firms, therefore reducing
profits of those firms and increasing the probability of bankruptcies.
Finally, the negative sign on the coefficient of the pandemic dummy variable suggests that firms
were less likely to go bankrupt during the pandemic relative to the preceding six years. This is
consistent with the plots shown above, which depict drops in bankruptcy levels for many
industry sectors and provinces during the onset of the pandemic. Given our control of factors that
reflect domestic demand and foreign economic conditions, this suggests that some measure(s)
implemented in the country in response to the pandemic boosted firms’ capacity to stay afloat.
The Canada Emergency Business Account (CEBA) program, adopted by the Canadian
government in 2020 to provide relief to firms in the form of interest-free loans of up to $40,0007,
is a strong contender for such a measure. Hence the inclusion of CEBA loan data in future
analyses may be fruitful.

5

Japan (JPN) and Canada (CAN) Trade | OEC - The Observatory of Economic Complexity; Canada (CAN) and United
Kingdom (GBR) Trade | OEC - The Observatory of Economic Complexity; China (CHN) and Canada (CAN) Trade |
OEC - The Observatory of Economic Complexity.
6
Canada | United States Trade Representative (ustr.gov)
7
Canada Emergency Business Account (CEBA) (ceba-cuec.ca)
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Table 3
Zero-Inflated Poisson GLM Model Results, 2014-2022 Data
Estimate
P-Value
Intercept
Provinces, relative to Alberta
British Columbia
Manitoba
New Brunswick
Newfoundland and Labrador
Nova Scotia
Ontario
Prince Edward Island
Quebec
Saskatchewan
Restriction Index, Monthly Change
NAICS, relative to Sector 72
Sector 11
Sector 21
Sector 22
Sector 23
Sectors 31-33
Sector 41
Sectors 44-45
Sectors 48-49
Sector 51
Sector 52
Sector 53
Sector 54
Sector 55
Sector 56
Sector 61
Sector 62
Sector 71
Sector 81
Sector 91
Industry GDP % Change
Sector 11
Sector 21
Sector 22
Sector 23
Sectors 31-33
Sector 41
Sectors 44-45
Sectors 48-49
21

AME

8.72E-01

< 2e-16 (***)

-9.34E-02
-1.47E+00
-1.25E+00
-1.91E+00
-1.17E+00
1.64E+00
-2.87E+00
2.43E+00
-5.60E-01
-1.07E-05

< 2e-16 (***)
< 2e-16 (***)
< 2e-16 (***)
< 2e-16 (***)
< 2e-16 (***)
< 2e-16 (***)
< 2e-16 (***)
< 2e-16 (***)
< 2e-16 (***)
< 2e-16 (***)

-0.0644
-0.5569
-0.5149
-0.6154
-0.4974
2.994
-0.6815
7.5286
-0.3095
0

-1.97E+00
-1.87E+00
-4.22E+00
1.38E-01
-5.47E-01
-1.14E+00
-2.73E-01
-8.96E-01
-2.13E+00
-2.16E+00
-1.33E+00
-7.42E-01
-2.11E+00
-1.14E+00
-2.72E+00
-1.92E+00
-1.87E+00
-1.10E+00
-5.29E+00

< 2e-16 (***)
< 2e-16 (***)
< 2e-16 (***)
< 2e-16 (***)
< 2e-16 (***)
< 2e-16 (***)
< 2e-16 (***)
< 2e-16 (***)
< 2e-16 (***)
< 2e-16 (***)
< 2e-16 (***)
< 2e-16 (***)
< 2e-16 (***)
< 2e-16 (***)
< 2e-16 (***)
< 2e-16 (***)
< 2e-16 (***)
< 2e-16 (***)
< 2e-16 (***)

-3.8679
-4.1114
-4.4264
0.6661
-1.89
-3.062
-1.0718
-2.6558
-3.9571
-3.9751
-3.305
-2.3515
-3.9483
-3.0597
-4.199
-3.8374
-3.8017
-2.9966
-4.4697

2.94E-02
5.99E-02
-1.71E-01
-1.61E-02
-5.74E-03
5.39E-03
-1.85E-03
-1.28E-03

0.000947 (***)
< 2e-16 (***)
< 2e-16 (***)
< 2e-16 (***)
0.007517 (**)
0.059415 (.)
0.185759
0.644761

0.0427
0.0868
-0.2479
-0.0234
-0.0083
0.0078
-0.0027
-0.0019

Sector 51
Sector 52
Sector 53
Sector 54
Sector 55
Sector 56
Sector 61
Sector 62
Sector 71
Sector 72
Sector 81
Sector 91
Overnight Rate
Restriction Level, relative to "Cancel public events"
Close public transport
Daycare closing
Gym closings
Hair salons and barbershop closures
International travel controls
Public information campaigns
Restrictions on gathering indoor
Restrictions on gathering outdoor
Restrictions on internal movement
Restrictions on non-essential retail businesses
Restrictions on restaurant for in-person dining
School closing
Stay at home requirements
Workplace closing
Exchange Rates % Change
CNYCAD
JPYCAD
GBPCAD
USDCAD
CPI % Change
Exports % Change
Imports % Change
Liquidity Premium
During Pandemic (Yes or No)

V.

5.01E-02
3.36E-02
-3.96E-02
-3.54E-02
-9.57E-02
-1.44E-02
1.06E-01
6.23E-02
-8.88E-03
3.47E-03
-8.79E-03
6.03E-01
4.67E-04

0.005742 (**)
0.060426 (.)
0.012581 (*)
1.55e-15 (***)
< 2e-16 (***)
3.34e-06 (***)
< 2e-16 (***)
< 2e-16 (***)
5.34e-07 (***)
5.34e-07 (***)
6.61e-05 (***)
3.57e-08 (***)
0.928523

-6.89E-06
-3.37E-06
9.80E-07
5.71E-07
-6.60E-08
1.32E-06
5.74E-07
-2.04E-07
-2.48E-07
-7.14E-07
-6.81E-08
-2.72E-07
-5.13E-06
-4.17E-07

0.999345
0.999679
0.999907
0.999946
0.999994
0.999875
0.999945
0.999981
0.999976
0.999932
0.999994
0.999974
0.999512
0.99996

2.17E-02
-5.34E-03
-6.47E-03
-2.90E-03
-8.96E-03
-1.42E-03
9.95E-03
5.49E-01
-4.33E-01

< 2e-16 (***)
4.25e-10 (***)
1.15e-11 (***)
0.085346 (.)
9.69e-06 (***)
0.010737 (*)
< 2e-16 (***)
< 2e-16 (***)
< 2e-16 (***)

Predictions

This last section presents the results from four predictions made using the specified model – for
bankruptcies in 2019, 2020-2022, 2021-2022 (without pandemic data) and 2021-2022 (with
pandemic data). The choice of prediction intervals was motivated by the desire to identify the
22

0.0727
0.0488
-0.0574
-0.0514
-0.1389
-0.0209
0.1537
0.0903
-0.0129
0.005
-0.0127
0.8751
0.0007
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.0315
-0.0078
-0.0094
-0.0042
-0.013
-0.0021
0.0144
0.7967
-0.628

existence of structural differences across industry sectors that lead to differing decisions in the
face of credit constraints, as the one occasioned by the pandemic. The point is to contrast the
model’s ability to correctly predict bankruptcy values in different periods. The coupling of the
model’s capability to accurately predict bankruptcies before the pandemic with its inability to do
so for the pandemic period suggests an underlying heterogeneity in firms’ decisions. This is in
line with our prediction results.
Four pieces of information are provided for each prediction: a frequency table showing the
percentage of observations that the model accurately predicted to be either 0 or different than 0, a
plot of the natural log of non-zero actual values versus the natural log of non-zero predicted
values along with a trend in blue and a 45-degree line in red, a table with the percentage of points
above and below the 45-degree line in the respective plot, and plots of the prediction errors. For
the purpose of the frequency tables and choice of observations to exclude from the plot, because
the model produces non-discrete predictions, predicted values below 0.5 were considered as 0,
while values above 0.5 were considered as “not 0”.
Visually, the trend line in the 2019 plot was the closest to the 45-degree line, suggesting that this
period had the best predictions. This is reinforced by the percentage of “correct” (either 0 or not
0) predictions shown in the frequency tables: 81.91% for 2019, 72.85% for 2020-2022, 73.08%
for 2021-2022 (without pandemic data), and 78.67% for 2021-2022 (with pandemic data). By
contrast, 2020-2022 had both the worst trend and least correct predictions.
The inclusion of pandemic-related variables (restriction levels, restriction index change, and
dummy for the pandemic period) in the predictions for 2021-2022 increased the model’s
accuracy relative to the predictions both for the same period without pandemic data and for
2020-2022. The increased precision appears to have come from the considerably higher
percentage of values that the model correctly predicted as 0 – 51.8% for 2020-2022, 51.14% for
2021-2022 without pandemic data, and 58.36% for 2021-2022 with pandemic data.
Interestingly, attempting to predict bankruptcy values for the pandemic period without the
inclusion of pandemic data results in a higher number of overestimations – for 2020-2022 and
2021-2022 (without pandemic data), 47.53% and 46.25%, respectively, of model predictions
exceeded actual values. This stands in contrast with 33.96% of overestimations for 2021-2022
with the inclusion of pandemic data. Accordingly, predictions in the latter case mostly
underestimated actual values.
Finally, the prediction errors of all four predictions were heteroskedastic, with errors for the
2020-2022 prediction showing the weakest heteroskedasticity. Moreover, errors for the 20212022 predictions seem to be heavily skewed to the left, with the prediction using bankruptcy data
being the most skewed.

i.

Plots: Predicted vs. Actual Bankruptcy Values (non-zero)
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Plot 35: Model Predictions - Predicted vs. Actual Bankruptcy Values, 2019

Plot 36: Model Predictions - Predicted vs. Actual Bankruptcy Values, 2020-2022
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Plot 36: Model Predictions - Predicted vs. Actual Bankruptcies, 2021-2022, without pandemic data
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Table 4
Predictions: predicted and actual values, 0 or not 0
Period

2019

2020-2022

2021-2022
(without pandemic
data)

2021-2022
(with pandemic data)

Actual

Actual

Actual

Actual

Predicted vs. Actual Values (0 or not 0)
Predicted
0 (below 0.5)
0
22208 (57.86%)
not 0
3648 (9.5%)
Predicted
0 (below 0.5)
0
43072 (51.8%)
not 0
18272 (21.97%)
Predicted
0 (below 0.5)
0
22896 (51.14%)
Not 0
10544 (23.55%)
Predicted
0 (below 0.5)
0
26127 (58.36%)
not 0
7313 (16.34%)

not 0 (above 0.5)
3296 (8.59%)
9232 (24.05%)
not 0 (above 0.5)
4304 (5.18%)
17504 (21.05%)
not 0 (above 0.5)
1504 (3.36%)
9824 (21.94%)
not 0 (above 0.5)
2234 (4.99%)
9094 (20.31%)

Table 5
Predictions: number of points below and above 45° line in plot of predicted and actual
values
Period
2019
2020-2022
2021-2022
(without pandemic
data)
2021-2022
(with pandemic data)

Number of points below 45° line
2912 (31.54%)
8320 (47.53%)

Number of points above 45° line
6320 (68.46%)
9184 (52.47%)

4544 (46.25%)

5280 (53.75%)

3088 (33.96%)

6006 (66.04%)

26

ii.

Plots: Prediction Errors (non-zero)
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VI. Conclusion
The previous results accord with the previous findings that, in the aggregate, bankruptcies went
down during the pandemic. Moreover, it is noticeable that despite controlling for different
industry sectors as well as provincial and national frictions that directly resulted from the
pandemic, such as lower industry GDPs, restriction levels and indexes, distortions to foreign
trade, and financial easing by the central bank, the model still did not fully capture changes in
bankruptcy levels. This is evidence that some other external measure influenced firms’ decisions
to shut down, and that this measure affected different industry sectors differently.

31

References

3-month or 90-day rates and yields: Interbank rates for Canada. FRED. (2022, August 11).
Retrieved August 15, 2022, from https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/IR3TIB01CAM156N
Canada, P. H. A. of. (2021, May 28). Covid-19 epidemiology update. Canada.ca. Retrieved
August 15, 2022, from https://health-infobase.canada.ca/covid-19/epidemiologicalsummary-covid-19-cases.html
Canadian interest rates and monetary policy variables: 10-year lookup. Bank of Canada. (n.d.).
Retrieved August 15, 2022, from https://www.bankofcanada.ca/rates/interestrates/canadian-interest-rates/
Consumer price index, 2000 to present. Bank of Canada. (n.d.). Retrieved August 15, 2022, from
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/rates/price-indexes/cpi/
CSSEGISandData. (n.d.). CSSEGISANDDATA/covid-19: Novel coronavirus (COVID-19) cases,
provided by JHU CSSE. GitHub. Retrieved August 15, 2022, from
https://github.com/CSSEGISandData/COVID-19
Daily Exchange rates. Bank of Canada. (n.d.). Retrieved August 15, 2022, from
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/rates/exchange/daily-exchange-rates/
Federal funds effective rate. FRED. (2022, August 1). Retrieved August 15, 2022, from
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/fedfunds
Government of Canada, S. C. (2022, July 8). Canadian survey on business conditions (CSBC).
Other reference periods - Surveys and statistical programs. Retrieved August 15, 2022,
from https://www23.statcan.gc.ca/imdb/p2SV.pl?Function=getInstanceList&Id=1330334
Government of Canada, Statistics Canada. (2022, July 29). Gross domestic product (GDP) at
basic prices, by industry, annual average, industry detail. Retrieved August 15, 2022, from
https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3610043406
Historical noon and closing rates. Bank of Canada. (n.d.). Retrieved August 15, 2022, from
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/rates/exchange/legacy-noon-and-closing-rates/
Long-term government bond yields: 10-year: Main (including benchmark) for the United States.
FRED. (2022, August 11). Retrieved August 15, 2022, from
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/IRLTLT01USM156N
Monthly Exchange rates. Bank of Canada. (n.d.). Retrieved August 15, 2022, from
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/rates/exchange/monthly-exchange-rates/

32

Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy. (2022, May 10). Statistics and research. Office of
the Superintendent of Bankruptcy Canada. Retrieved August 15, 2022, from
https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/bsf-osb.nsf/eng/h_br01011.html

33

